



TOP SECRET

25X1



13 July 1963

25X1



Copy No. 2-1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1



State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

25X1


Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

13 July 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


CONTENTS

25X1



2. Ecuador: The military junta consolidates its position. (Page 3)
3. Communist China - USSR: Impasse clearly reached in Sino-Soviet talks. (Page 4)
4. Dominican Republic: Proposed legislation to curb police powers would reduce strength of rightist opposition. (Page 6)

25X1



7. US - USSR - North Korea: Moscow makes another gesture designed to create a favorable atmosphere for test-ban talks. (Page 9)
8. West Germany: The Ministry of Defense shows interest in building a nuclear research reactor. (Page 10)

25X1

9. Notes: Laos;
South Korea;



Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

Ecuador: The military junta which took power late on 11 July has now consolidated its position, established military control throughout the country, and begun to restaff the top-level posts from which the former President's appointees have been ousted. The junta, whose members have long been critical of Arosemena's lax attitude toward the Communists, says its objective is to carry out constitutional and economic reforms.

One junta member, responding to a question from the US ambassador, estimated that elections scheduled for 1964 would be postponed for a year. He said the junta did not want to repeat the mistake of the Peruvian junta "which missed an opportunity to institute widespread reforms."

Reaction to the military move is becoming more organized. The Communist-dominated Confederation of Workers of Ecuador may call a general strike, although the junta's proclamation of martial law specifically prohibits strikes for any reason.

*Guayaquil's mayor, Asad Bucaram, led a protest movement and as a result was removed from office. He was replaced by Doctor Arsenio Espinoza Smith, a member of the city council. A small group of "pro-constitutionalists" supported the succession of former Vice President Varela, but he had already been rejected and exiled by the junta because of his alleged implication in an arms-purchase scandal.

25X1

***Communist China - USSR:** The Sino-Soviet talks have clearly reached a complete impasse and will probably be brought to an end soon.

Apparently in anticipation of a public display of failure, the Chinese, in the 13 July People's Daily editorial, are attempting to shunt responsibility on to the Soviet party in advance. The editorial accuses the Soviets of closing out the negotiations even before they started by "categorically rejecting" the views offered in the Chinese 14 June letter. The Chinese claim that despite this they hoped the talks would be conducted calmly and relations consequently eased, but they find themselves "forced to point out with heavy hearts" that this is not the case.

The editorial is entitled, "We Want Unity, Not a Split," but the Chinese make it clear throughout that only unity on their own terms will do. The Chinese are apparently confident that their position is the stronger and appear willing to face the consequences of a break if the Soviets desire it. There is heavy emphasis in the editorial on the Soviet fear of printing the "truth" contained in Chinese documents while the Chinese are willing to give the "false" Soviet positions full publicity.

Probably reflecting a refusal by their negotiators in the talks to agree to a cessation of polemics as the USSR wishes, the editorial rejects the notion that the Soviets can consider their "own words final and refuse to let others speak." The Chinese note

25X1

that the present situation is "very grave," but their reiteration that further bilateral talks could be held if one session failed to resolve differences suggests that one result of the present talks may be an effort to maintain the appearance of unity by an agreement to hold subsequent talks.

That neither side is very eager to engage in another such exercise in futility soon, however, can be seen in the editorial's assertion that if differences cannot be resolved this year, "they can wait until next year."

25X1

Dominican Republic: A Senate proposal aimed at curbing the powers of principal police leaders--dangerous political foes of President Juan Bosch--could lead to a confrontation which would threaten internal stability.

The bill, which has bipartisan support, would strip police chief Belisario Peguero of numerous powers and remove from the police general staff his close friend Antonio Imbert and Luis Amiama Tio--the only survivors of the group which assassinated Trujillo. Imbert, while a leader in the seven-man council of state government which preceded the Bosch administration, maneuvered with Amiama to get full control of the government, and might now use extralegal methods to return to power.

Initiative for the bill apparently came from leaders of Bosch's party who are impatient with his reluctance to move to curb Peguero's and Imbert's almost unlimited control over the strong police force.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

US - USSR - North Korea: (Moscow continues to make gestures designed to create a favorable atmosphere for the forthcoming test-ban talks.)

(On 10 July, Soviet UN delegate Federenko approached the acting US delegate, Ambassador Plimpton, to express his "personal opinion" that Moscow would use its good offices to attempt the release of the two US helicopter crewmen held in North Korea since mid-May. He suggested that Ambassador Kohler bring up the matter again with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Earlier US requests for Soviet action, in Moscow and New York, brought no response.)

25X1
[] (The Soviet Union no longer has much influence with the Pyongyang regime, however, and it is doubtful that a simple Soviet demarche to North Korea would alter Pyongyang's position on the question of the crewmen.)

(*Following Washington's instructions, the US Embassy deputy chief of mission yesterday asked Smirnovsky, the head of the US section of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what Moscow had done with the US request for aid in securing the release of the crewmen. The Soviet official noted that his government had already informed Pyongyang about the US inquiry and stated that "this constitutes the full response" to the US request. His failure to mention North Korea's reaction suggests that it was negative.) []

25X1

West Germany: The West German Ministry of Defense is displaying interest in building a nuclear research reactor for military purposes.

The subject of delivery of nuclear fuel elements for such a research reactor is included on the agenda Bonn has proposed for forthcoming talks with Secretary McNamara. The precise purpose of this reactor is not clear.

25X1

NOTES

Laos: With Kong Le's departure abroad for medical treatment of a chronic sinus condition imminent, a subordinate officer--Colonel Somboun--is apparently slated to become interim head of the neutralist forces. Kong Le, while a symbol of the neutralists' resistance to Communist pressure, has shown serious limitations as a senior military commander. His departure may facilitate efforts already under way, with the cooperation of Souvanna and General Phoumi, to improve the logistics and organization of the neutralist forces and to effect better coordination with supporting rightist elements.

25X1

25X1

South Korea: A reshuffle of top posts in the South Korean junta strengthens the faction of former security chief Kim Chong-pil. Kim Hyong-uk, one of Kim Chong-pil's strongest supporters, has replaced Kim Chae-chun as director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency. The latter's removal is a setback for the moderate forces in the struggle for control of the regime's political apparatus.

25X1

13 July 63

DAILY BRIEF

12

25X1

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

25X1
[]
The United States Intelligence Board, on 10 July 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimates:

SNIE 53-2-63: "Situation in South Vietnam"

[] 25X1

NIE 93-2-63: "The Situation and Prospects in Brazil"

[] 25X1

13 July 63

DAILY BRIEF

13

THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
 Special Counsel to the President
 The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 The Scientific Adviser to the President
 The Director of the Budget
 The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
 The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
 The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific
 Commander in Chief, Atlantic
 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
 The Attorney General
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
 The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
 The Chairman
The National Security Agency
 The Director
The United States Information Agency
 The Director
The National Indications Center
 The Director

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007100250001-5

TOP SECRET